Give it a thumb
The War on Terrorism
The Mistaken Means of Social Change - Part 4
THE STRATEGY TO GET THE U.S. INTO WAR
George Viereck, in his book, The Strangest Friendship in History - Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House , said this: "Ten months before the election, which returned Wilson to the White House because he 'kept us out of war,' Colonel House negotiated a secret agreement with England and France on behalf of Wilson which pledged the United States to intervene on behalf of the Allies. If an inkling of the conversation between Colonel House and the leaders of England and France had reached the American people before the election, it might have caused incalculable reverberations in public opinion."
How did they do it? How did these collectivists maneuver the United States into war? It was not easy, and it came about only after extensive planning. The first plan was to offer the United State as a negotiator between both sides of the conflict. They would position the U.S. as the great peacemaker. But the goal was just the opposite of peace. They would make an offer to both sides that they knew would not be acceptable to Germany. Then, when the Germans rejected the offer, they would be portrayed in the press as the bad guys, the ones who wanted to continue the war. This is how the plan was described by Ambassador Page in his memoirs. He said: "Colonel House arrived … full of the idea of American intervention. First his plan was that he and I and a group of the British cabinet should at once work out a minimum program of peace which he assumed would be unacceptable to the Germans, and that the President would take this program and present it to both sides. The side that declined would be responsible for continuing the war. Of course the fatal moral weakness of the foregoing scheme is that we should plunge into the war, not on the merits of the cause, but by a carefully sprung trick."
AGGRAVATE, INSULATE, FACILITATE
The trick eventually evolved into something far more dramatic than deceptive peace negotiations. It called for three strategies in one. They were: aggravate, insulate, and facilitate.
The first stage was to aggravate the Germans into an attack, literally to goad them until they had no choice but to strike back. Much of this was implemented from the British side. For example, Churchill established the policy of ramming German submarines. Prior to that, the code of warfare on the seas required that, if a submarine challenged an unarmed merchant ship, it would fire a shot across its bow. The merchant ship would be expected to stop its engines and it would be given time for the crew to get into lifeboats before the submarine would sink the ship. It was a small humanitarian gesture in the middle of warfare. That is the way it was done until Churchill, as Lord of the Admiralty, ordered all merchant ships, regardless of circumstances, to steam full speed directly toward the submarines and attempt to ram them and sink them. They actually succeeded in doing that a few times. This eliminated the distinction between merchant ships and war ships. Henceforth, all merchant ships had to be considered as war ships. Not surprisingly, Germany quickly adopted the policy of no more warning shots.
When that happened, those seeking to involve the United States in the war had a heyday. Editorializing through the British and American press, they said: "See how evil these Germans are? They sink unarmed ships and don't even give the crews a chance to get off! It is our moral duty to fight against such evil."
Churchill also ordered British ships to fly American flags so the Germans wouldn't know if they were really British or American. He wanted German submarines to strike American ships, even if by accident. It was his strategy to do whatever possible to bring the United States into war on the side of Great Britain, and the sinking of an American ship by Germany would have been an excellent way of doing so.
There was plenty of goading from the America side as well. The United States government consistently violated its own neutrality laws by allowing war materials to be sent to Britain and France. Munitions and all kinds of military-related supplies were blatantly shipped on a regular basis. In fact, the Lusitania, on the day it was sunk, was loaded with military arsenal. The Germans knew all along that this was going on. The people in Washington knew it as well. By openly violating their own neutrality laws, they were doing everything possible to aggravate Germany into an attack.
The second prong of the strategy was to insulate. That means to insulate the victims from information that would have allowed them to protect themselves. You can't have a successful surprise attack if you tell the victims in advance that they are likely to be targeted. It was important not to let any of the Lusitania passengers know that the ship was carrying war materials and was likely to be sunk. They could not be allowed to know that several of its decks, normally assigned to passenger quarters, had been cleared out and loaded with military-related supplies, including ammunition and explosive primers. They could not be informed that they would be riding on a floating ammunition depot. The German embassy tried to warn American civilians not to book passage on that ship. They placed an advertisement in fifty newspapers, mostly along the eastern seaboard, warning that the Lusitania would be in danger, that it was heading into hostile waters, and that Americans should not be on board.
The U.S. State Department contacted all fifty of those newspapers and ordered them not to publish the ad. They threatened that they would be in dire trouble with the government if they did. There was only one newspaper, in Des Moines Iowa, that had the guts to go ahead and run the ad anyway - which is why we know about it today. Unfortunately, an ad in Des Moines was of small value to the people in New York who were actually boarding the ship.
SINK THE LUSITANIA!
The third prong of the strategy was to facilitate. That means to make it easy for the enemy to strike and be successful. On the morning of the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel House was in Britain and recorded in his diaries that he spoke with Sr. Edward Gray and King George. They calmly discussed what they thought the reaction of the American people would be if the Lusitania were to be "accidentally" sunk. This is what Colonel House wrote: "I told Sir Gray if this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep America which would in itself carry us into the war."
Four hours after that conversation, the Lusitania entered the war zone where German submarines were known to be active. Designed and built by the British as a ship of war, she had four boilers and was very fast and could outrun a submarine. That means she was vulnerable only to subs that were ahead of her path, not those to the side or behind. This greatly improved her chances for survival, especially with a military escort running ahead. However, this was not to be her destiny. On this voyage she had been ordered to turn off one of her boilers. She was running on three turbines instead of four. At only 75% speed, she was now vulnerable to attack from all sides.
The Juno was a British destroyer, which had been assigned to escort her through those dangerous waters. At the last minute, the Juno was called back by the British Admiralty and never made its rendezvous. Inevitably, the Lusitania, running at reduced speed, and without protection, pulled into the periscope view of the U-20 German submarine. One torpedo was fired directly mid center. There was a mighty explosion. As the Germans were preparing for the second torpedo, much to their surprise, there was a second explosion, and the whole bottom of the ship blew out. Exploration of the wreckage in later years shows that it was an outward explosion. Something inside blew up with a tremendous force, and the great ship sank in less than eighteen minutes.
The strategists finally had their cause. To the unknowing world, this was the dastardly deed of those war-mongering Germans who were sinking passenger ships with innocent American civilians on board. The flame of indignation was ignited and eventually it did sweep America into war on April 16, 1917. Eight days later, Congress authorized $1 billion of taxpayer money to be sent to Britain and France to assist in the war effort. The next day, the first $200 million was sent to Britain and immediately applied to the Morgan debt. A few days later, $100 million was sent to France, and the same thing happened. It was applied to the Morgan debt. By the end of the war, $9.5 billion had been sent to the Allies and applied to the Morgan Debt. Add to that the infinitely higher cost of American blood sacrificed on the alter of collectivism in a war supposedly to make the world "safe for democracy," and you begin to see a different aspect of World War I than has been popularized in orthodox history books - which, incidentally, have been written and funded by collectivists.
WORLD WAR II
We are back in our time machine now and find ourselves at World War II. The parallels with World War I are striking. Britain again was losing the war with Germany. The president of the United States, again, was an internationalist surrounded by Fabians and Leninists. The primary difference was that the center of gravity in the CFR was swinging away from the Morgan group and toward the Rockefeller group. Other than that, things were pretty much the same. Colonel House was still a presidential advisor, but his rooms at the White House were now occupied by Harry Hopkins. Hopkins was not a collectivist agent of the Fabians; he was a collectivist agent of the Soviets. The American people were still opposed to war. However, once again there were secret arrangements at the highest levels of government to maneuver the United States into war without the voters suspecting it. The strategy was to get the Axis powers to strike first, all the while telling and reassuring the American people that their leaders were opposed to war. It was almost an exact repeat of the ploy used in World War I.
On October 30, 1941, in a campaign speech in Boston, FDR made this amazing statement: "And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I will give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." FDR repeated that pledge many times, all the while working behind the scenes to get the United States into war. FDR's speechwriter at that time was Robert Sherwood, who later became a famous playwright. On this topic, Sherwood said: "Unfortunately for my own conscience, I happened to be one of those who urged him to go the limit on this, feeling as I did, that any risk of future embarrassment was negligible as compared to the risk of losing the election."
As FDR was delivering this soothing message to the voters, the American and British military staffs were meeting secretly in Washington D.C., working out the details of a joint strategy. They planned, not only how to get the United States into the war, but how to conduct the war afterward. The resulting agreement was called the ABC-1. It was incorporated into a Navy war plan and given the code name Rainbow Number Five. We now have a great deal of information on this plan although, at the time, it was highly secret. The key for getting into the war was to maneuver the Axis powers to strike first to make it look like the U.S. was an innocent victim. Their first hope was that Germany would attack. If that did not work, the fallback plan was to involve Japan.
In an effort to provoke an attack from Germany, FDR sent U.S. Naval ships to escort British convoys carrying war supplies, knowing that they would be targets for German submarine attack. When Germany refused to take the bait, he ordered U.S. ships to actually get into the middle of sea battles between British and German war ships. The strategy was simple. If one walks into the middle of a barroom brawl, the chances of getting slugged are pretty good.
On October 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the USS Kearny, rushed to assist a British convoy near Iceland that was under attack by German submarines. It took a torpedo hit and was badly damaged. Ten days later, FDR made this statement to the nation: "We have wished to avoid shooting, but the shooting has started, and history has recorded who has fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot. America has been attacked. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a Navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman, and child in this nation…. Hitler's torpedo was directed at every American."
When it was later revealed that the Kearny had aggressively sought combat, the public lost interest, and FDR dropped the rhetoric. It was time to involve Japan.
MANEUVERING THE JAPANESE INTO FIRING THE FIRST SHOT
The Secretary of War at that time was Henry Stimson, a member of the CFR. In his diaries he said: "In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that, in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there could be no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors…. The question was, how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition."
How was this done? It was accomplished exactly as in World War I: aggravate, facilitate, insulate. Aggravate the enemy into an attack. Facilitate his attack to make it easy with no opposition. Insulate the victims from any knowledge that would allow them to escape their fate.
For many years, the government denied any knowledge of the impending Japanese attack. Gradually, however, the pieces of the puzzle began to bubble up out of the mire of secrecy and, one by one, they have been assembled into a clear picture of the most monstrous cover-up one can possibly imagine. The smoking gun was discovered in 1995. Author Robert Stinnett found a memo in the Navy Archives written by Lt. Commander Arthur McCollum, who was assigned to Naval Intelligence. The memo was dated October 7, 1940. It was directed to two of FDR's top naval advisors: Captain Dudley Knox and Capt. Walter Anderson, who was head of Naval Intelligence. This memo was approved by both men and forwarded to FDR for action. The full text is now public information, and a photo of it appears in Stinnett's book, Day of Deceit; The Truth about FDR and Peal Harbor.
The McCollum memorandum contained an eight-point action plan to implement a two-point strategy. The two points were: (1) Aggravate Japan into a military strike as a matter of economic necessity and national honor on her part; (2) Facilitate the attack by not interfering with Japan's preparations and by making the target as vulnerable as possible. The memorandum concluded with this phrase: "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better."
The necessity to insulate the victims from any foreknowledge of the attack was not mentioned in this memorandum but it was not necessary to do so. Obviously, this plan could not succeed if the targeted victims were warned in advance. So, once again, there was the familiar strategy: aggravate, insulate, and facilitate.
Was Japan aggravated into an attack? Judge for yourself. The sale of critical goods from the United States to Japan was suddenly embargoed; commerce was brought to a standstill; Japan's access to oil from the Dutch East Indies was crippled by U.S. diplomatic pressure on the Dutch government; the U.S. closed off the Panama Canal to Japanese ships; and Japan's major assets in the United States were seized by the government. In other words, the strategy advanced by Lt. Commander McCollum was followed in every detail. There was a deliberate assault against Japan's economy and an insult to her national honor. A military response was predictable. The only question was when.
MAKING PEARL HARBOR AN EASY TARGET
Was Japan facilitated in the attack? There is massive evidence to support that conclusion, but we have time here for only a few examples. A Japanese spy by the name of Tadashi Morimura was sent to Pearl Harbor under the cover of a phony political assignment at the Japanese embassy. The FBI knew that his real name was Takeo Yoshikawa and that he had been trained as a military officer. He had no political experience, so they knew his assignment to a political post was a cover. They photographed him as he came off the ship. They tracked him everywhere he went. They bugged his telephone. They knew what he was doing every minute of the day. Often he would take a car to the top of a hill overlooking the harbor and photograph the location of ships. Then he would use a clandestine radio to send coded messages to Japan giving the exact grid locations for all the ships, the times of their movements, how many soldiers and sailors were on duty, what time they reported, and what time they left the base. All of this information was clearly of military importance and pointed to the possibility of a surprise attack. The FBI wanted to arrest Yoshikawa and send him home, but the Office of Naval Intelligence intervened, with White House approval, saying: Leave this guy alone. He is our responsibility. We will handle it. J. Edgar Hoover, who was head of the FBI at that time, objected strongly, and it almost erupted into a contest of inter-agency authority between the FBI and Naval Intelligence. In the end, Naval Intelligence had its way, and Yoshikawa was allowed to continue his mission without even knowing he was being watched.
Only four days before the attack, U.S. Navy Intelligence intercepted this message from Yoshikawa: "NO CHANGE OBSERVED BY AFTERNOON OF 2 DECEMBER. SO FAR THEY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ALERTED. SHORE LEAVE AS USUAL."
On December 6, just one day before the attack, this message was intercepted: "THERE ARE NO BARRAGE BALLOONS AT THESE PLACES - AND CONSIDERABLE OPPORTUNITY IS LEFT FOR A SURPRISE ATTACK."
It was bizarre. Here was an enemy agent gathering strategic information in preparation for a surprise attack on American forces, and people at the highest levels of the United States government were protecting him. They deliberately allowed the flow of information to continue so the Japanese would be successful in their mission.
VACANT SEAS POLICY
Another example of facilitating the attack on Pearl Harbor is what was called the Vacant Seas Policy. For many months, the Navy had known from what direction the Japanese were likely to approach, what sea corridor they would use to launch their attack. They even had conducted maneuvers simulating it themselves. One was called Exercise 191 and the other OPORD1. Because of weather patterns, sea currents, location of commercial ship lanes, demand on fuel supplies, and other factors, they knew that the Japanese would approach from the North Pacific Ocean in an operational area between 157 and 158 degrees west longitude. This presented a special challenge. If the crew of any ship had seen a Japanese armada steaming toward Hawaii, they undoubtedly would have used the radio to send word ahead. They would have said: "Hey, there is something going on here. There is a fleet of aircraft carriers and destroyers heading your way." That, of course, would have spoiled everything. Also, if the Japanese knew that their approach had been detected, they would have lost the advantage of surprise and might have aborted their plan.
American intelligence was well aware of every stage of Japanese preparations. It was already known that Admiral Nagumo was outfitting his carrier strike force at Hitokappu Bay on the Japanese island of Etorofu. His progress was monitored closely, and daily reports were sent to Washington. His ships departed from Japan and headed for Pearl Harbor on November 25. One hour later, Navy headquarters in Washington initiated the Vacant Seas directive that all military and commercial ships must now stay out of the North Pacific corridor. They were diverted hundreds of miles on a trans-Pacific route through the Torres Straits so there would be no encounter that might alert the intended victims or cause the Japanese to abort their mission.
The next stage in this strategy was to bring the ships of the 7th Fleet home from sea duty and bottle them up inside Pearl Harbor where they could not maneuver or disperse. This, of course, would make them easy targets. To accomplish this over the strong objection of Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the Fleet, his superiors in Washington cut back on deliveries of fuel. Without fuel, Kimmel had no choice. He had to curtail training exercises at sea and bring two-thirds of his ships back into port. In his memoirs, published in 1955, he said: "Shortly after I organized the Fleet in three major task forces, I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only one at Peal Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were falling behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted at a time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact, and this alone, which made it necessary to have two task forces simultaneously in Pearl Harbor." A Congressional investigation in 1946 revealed that, just a few days before the attack, Navy headquarters in Washington ordered twenty-one of the most modern ships in the 7th Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and deploy at Wake and Midway Islands. The aircraft carriers, Lexington and Enterprise were among those ships. This not only left the remaining Fleet with drastically reduced protection, it also meant that the ships anchored in the harbor were primarily old relics from World War I, many of which were already slated to be scrapped. As Secretary of War Stimson had stated in his diaries: "The question was, how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much damage to ourselves." Sacrificing only the old and marginally useful ships was the solution to that problem.
Were the victims at Pear Harbor insulated from information that might have allowed them to protect themselves? Could those thousands of Americans who lost their lives been alerted in time to take defensive action? Or were they deliberately sacrificed on the alter of collectivism because their deaths were needed to create the emotional drama to justify going to war? The answer to this question is not a pleasant one.
INTERCEPTED CODED MESSAGES
Throughout this time, the Japanese were using a combination of military and diplomatic codes. United States intelligence agencies had cracked all of them. For three months prior to the allegedly surprise attack, they knew everything in minute detail. Yet, not one of those messages was ever forwarded to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. In his memoirs, Admiral Kimmel said: "At Pearl Harbor, General Short and I knew only a small part of the political story behind the Japanese attack. Care was taken not to send us the intercepted Japanese messages, which told in great detail each step in the Japanese program…. For three months prior to the attack on the fleet a wealth of vital information received in Washington was withheld from the commanders in Hawaii. The information received during the ten days preceding the attack clearly pointed to the fleet at Pearl Harbor as the Japanese objective, yet not one word of warning and none of this information was given to the Hawaii commanders."
The most important intercept of the Japanese code was obtained on the night before the attack. That message made clear even the exact hour that the strike would come. It was to be 1:00 PM Pearl Harbor time. The intercept was decoded 6½ hours before that. It was rushed to President Roosevelt and his top military advisors for immediate action. Their response was to do absolutely nothing. They sat on it and deliberately let the clock run out.
The military Chief of Staff at that time was General George Marshall, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Marshall claimed that he was on horseback that morning, riding in the park, and the reason he did not take immediate action was that he didn not know about the intercept until he arrived at his office at 11:25 AM, Washington time. However, even then he still had 1½ hours before the attack. He could have picked up the telephone and spoken to the Hawaii commanders directly. He could have used any one of several military radio systems designed for exactly such kinds of urgent communications, but he did none of those things. According to witnesses, he read and re-read the intercept and shuffled the paper from one side of his desk to the other while another half hour ticked away. Then, at 11:52, he finally sent a warning to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. The method? It was a commercial telegram sent through Western Union! It arrived six hours after the attack!